Requests to admit (“RTAs”) are a useful but often overlooked instrument in a litigator’s toolbox. Used to narrow the issues in dispute and to reduce the time and expense associated with proving uncontested facts or establishing the authenticity of documents, RTAs can also be used to secure admissions from opposing parties which, once made, can secure the release of a party from ongoing litigation.

An RTA can limit areas of disagreement in advance of trial and recent jurisprudence emphasizes that a party served with a proper RTA must respond thoughtfully. Denying the truth of every fact until closer to trial undermines the objectives of an already strained judicial system and hampers the parties from securing the most expeditious and least expensive determination of a dispute on its merits.

However, with the proliferation of images that are generated and/or altered by artificial intelligence, one is left questioning whether the “authenticity” of a document can ever be admitted absent guidance from an expert.

I. Introduction

In my May 2025 article, "The Shifting Landscape of Mortgage Enforcement: A Power of Sale Perspective in Ontario," I examined the uptick in power of sale proceedings and the mortgagee's duty to act providently when realizing on its security. In my follow-up piece, "Stepping into the Lender's Shoes: A Guarantor's Rights Under Section 2 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act," I explored how a paying guarantor can enforce when a borrower turns uncooperative. Those articles highlighted how rising defaults, fractured family finances and competing property interests have complicated mortgage enforcement in Ontario. This third article turns to a related procedural hurdle: the effect of Certificates of Pending Litigation on power of sale transactions.

Consider a scenario that has begun to surface in our practice: a mortgagee follows every step required by the Mortgages Act —provides proper notice, waits out the redemption period, obtains default judgment, and signs an Agreement of Purchase and Sale with a third party, promising clear title on closing. Then, the purchaser’s lawyer discovers a Certificate of Pending Litigation (‘CPL”) registered on title by a third party in litigation to which the mortgagee is not a party. The mortgagee first asks the land registry office to delete the registered instrument, but the registrar declines in the absence of consent or a court order. The mortgagee then seeks relief from the court, only to be met with a first‑instance decision that the court lacks jurisdiction to assist.

The recent Olympic and Paralympic games manifestly demonstrated, to quote the famous line from ABC’s Wide World of Sports the “thrill of victory” [the US victories over Canada in both men’s Olympic and Paralympic hockey, and women’s Olympic hockey], and the “agony of defeat” [Canada’s defeat by the US in both men’s Olympic and Paralympic hockey, and women’s Olympic hockey]. For the parties involved, motions for injunctive relief often emulate these “thrills” and “agonies”. 

Introduction

Generally speaking, administrative tribunals are given deference by reviewing courts in selecting their own procedure. Reviewing courts understand that tribunals must balance the procedural rights of parties to a fair hearing, with the need to expeditiously determine the matters before them.

But in Sharpe v. CTS Canadian College, 2026 ONSC 1138 (Div. Ct.), and Nuroh v. TD General Insurance Co., 2025 ONSC 6997 (Div. Ct.), the Divisional Court found that the processes chosen by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario and the License Appeal Tribunal were unfair. In both cases, the applicant’s ability to cross-examine a key witness was restricted.

Sharpe stems from the HRTO’s failure to adhere to its own rules that enshrine the right to cross-examine key witnesses, without explanation. By contrast, in Nuroh, the Divisional Court criticized the LAT for relying too much on its rules at the expense of a fair hearing.

Most family lawyers have used a joint expert at some point. Fewer have a clear sense of when joint retainers advance a file and when they create more problems than they solve. The difference matters. A well-managed joint retainer saves money, narrows issues, and moves files toward settlement. A poorly managed one generates motion after motion, escalates costs, and poisons settlement prospects.

Understanding where the line sits between those outcomes is not intuitive. It requires familiarity not only with the Family Law Rules, but with how courts apply them and how joint expert retainers operate in practice. This article unpacks the framework under Rules 20.1 and 20.2 of the Family Law Rules, flags the circumstances where joint retainers make sense, and identifies the practical problems that derail them.

The standard of procedural fairness in the context of adjudications initiated under the Construction Act is still nascent. Since the introduction of the adjudication process in 2019, very few matters have been brought to judicial review on the basis of procedural fairness. Adding to the significance of this question is the greater availability of adjudication since Bill 216: Building Ontario For You Act (Budget Measures) came into force in 2024 and permitted “a party to a contract [to] refer a dispute with the other party to the contract respecting any prescribed matter or any matter agreed to by the parties to adjudication.”

Despite a lack of established law, parties to an adjudication may still wish to evaluate the prospect of judicial review of an adjudicator’s decision. This article discusses the available resources that counsel can consider in order to provide guidance on whether procedural fairness is a live issue arising out of an adjudicatory decision.

If a will contains a drafting error, it is well-established in Ontario that the courts may be able to correct it after the testator has passed away through rectification. While this doctrine has been utilized successfully in numerous cases in recent years, rectification can still be difficult to obtain, as demonstrated by a string of recent cases where the courts dismissed requests for this relief. Not only is clear and cogent evidence required to obtain rectification, but in most cases, particularly where rectification is sought after probate has been granted, it appears that such evidence must come from the will-drafter, attesting to the drafting error. This article explores why evidence from the drafting solicitor is so critical when seeking rectification of a will, and then examines the rare circumstances in which this relief may be granted without such evidence. Lastly, a few practical tips for preparing an application to rectify a will are provided.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal's recent decision in Gitxaala v British Columbia (Chief Gold Commissioner) ("Gitxaala") dramatically increases the ability of Indigenous rights and title holders to use the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People ("UNDRIP") to advance and protect their interests. This article summarizes the decision and highlights two ways we have begun using this decision in our advocacy in British Columbia and across the country: 

• UNDRIP may expand the Duty to Consult and Accommodate ("DTCA"); and
• UNDRIP may be enforceable in the courts where the Crown is not delivering on its promise to recognize and implement UNDRIP rights.

Background

A claim is provable in bankruptcy if it falls under ss. 121–122 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, C. D-3 (“BIA”). If the obligation existed before bankruptcy, the resulting debt is part of the bankruptcy, even if the amount is unknown, contingent, or arises later. Under s. 69.3 of the BIA, all provable claims including family law claims are stayed upon bankruptcy, unless the court lifts the stay under s. 69.4 of the BIA. This paper addresses the impact of bankruptcy on support, equalization, and costs, and provides practical guidance for counsel.

Introduction

Summary judgment is a procedural tool intended to provide a fair and just alternative procedure, “without the expense and delay of a trial”. The Construction Act (the “Act”) does not explicitly provide for the availability of summary judgment; however, it is widely accepted that parties may bring a motion for summary judgment in construction lien matters. In fact, in Industrial Refrigerated Systems Inc v Quality Meat Packers, the court held that leave should rarely be refused, particularly when the motion has been heard on its merits.

It remains to be seen, however, whether a summary judgment can satisfy section 37 of the Act. In this article, we argue that the answer is that summary judgment should satisfy section 37. Summary judgment is a dispositive procedure, which, once granted, disposes of the claim. If leave is granted under the Act, it can dispose of a claim for lien, leaving nothing to be set down for trial.