1) Introduction: Information, Connection and Obligation

We live in an age of information, in which information is currency. Participation in an information economy constantly gives rise to relationships of trust, in which personal information is entrusted to those who are tasked, expressly or impliedly, with safeguarding it. In Jones v Tsige, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recognized that the relationships that necessarily emerge in an increasingly networked world must be regarded as legal relationships that gave rise to legal duties at common law:

The Internet and digital technology have brought an enormous change in the way we communicate and in our capacity to capture, store and retrieve information… routinely kept electronic databases render our most personal financial information vulnerable. Sensitive information as to our health is similarly available, as are records of the books we have borrowed or bought, the movies we have rented or downloaded, where we have shopped, where we have travelled and the nature of our communications by cellphone, e-mail or text message. It is within the capacity of the common law to evolve to respond to the problem posed by the routine collection and aggregation of highly personal information that is readily accessible in electronic form.

The Mareva Injunction and Pre-Judgment Garnishment Vacuum

Introduction

A judgment is only as good as a creditor’s ability to collect on it, and in Ontario, that ability turns on a question of timing. A plaintiff who suspects that a defendant is quietly moving money offshore, draining a bank account, or converting assets into something harder to trace, such as cryptocurrency, cannot simply ask the court to seize those assets while the lawsuit is pending. Ontario offers no general pre-judgment garnishment, and so the plaintiff must instead reach for an equitable remedy that was never designed to be a substitute for one: the Mareva injunction (sometimes with the assistance of a Norwich order).

This article argues that Ontario's reliance on equity to do the work of a statute it has declined to enact is the source of much of the doctrinal untidiness in this area, and that the rise of cryptocurrency disputes has unduly burdened legal practitioners in the satisfaction of securing a Mareva injunction. Legislative reform to address a codified Mareva injunction regime and the issue arise from a pre-judgment garnishment vacuum is warranted.

Introduction

Software tools or systems that use artificial intelligence often rely on third party providers to perform core AI functions such as processing user requests (input) and generating responses (output). Many use external AI “models” – complex mathematical and computational systems that analyze vast amounts of data to recognize patterns or make decisions - such as those offered by OpenAI, Google and Anthropic. These models analyze, interpret or respond to user input and produce output in the form of text, images, or speech. Depending on their design and capabilities, AI-enabled products may rely on additional components including open-source libraries, cloud infrastructure, computing resources, servers, and development tools to build, run and maintain AI systems. These building blocks are supplied, hosted or managed by the vendor of the product, its affiliates or by third party providers. The network of external components and third-party service providers that support the operation of an AI product is analogous to a traditional product supply chain in that multiple actors and dependencies contribute to the final product that is delivered to the user.

In Lundin Mining Corp. v. Markowich, the Supreme Court of Canada was presented with an opportunity to resolve one of the most persistent ambiguities in Canadian securities law: what does it mean for a development to constitute a change "in the business, operations or capital" of an issuer? These terms are not defined in securities legislation, regulatory instruments, policy statements, leading jurisprudence, or securities law textbooks. Lower courts have attempted to fill the void with various definitions, factors, and thresholds. Despite the clear need for conclusive guidance, the majority effectively declined the invitation.

The Court dismissed the dictionary definitions and thresholds used by lower courts. However, instead of interpreting the statutory terms, the Supreme Court restated settled law on factors not at issue, endorsed the Court of Appeal's seemingly tautological proposition that "a change is a change", and insisted that “business”, “operations” and “capital” are well enough understood without further elaboration.

The result is a decision that purports to clarify the law while leaving its central question unanswered.

Whereas past generations may have thought of gender as a binary concept — male and female — in recent years, gender identity has become much more complex. According to the 2021 Census, more than 100,000 people in Canada identify as transgender or non-binary, representing approximately 0.33% of the population aged 15 or older. 

As our understanding of gender evolves, it is important for lawyers to be respectful of gender diversity and avoid making assumptions about gender. For wills and estates practitioners, one way to achieve this objective is through gender-inclusive will drafting. Not only does such drafting show courtesy to those who survive the client, but gender-inclusive will drafting may also help minimize the need to apply to the court for directions. 

This article discusses three strategies for preparing gender-inclusive wills: the use of gender-neutral language, reducing the use of pronouns, and how to identify beneficiaries whose legal names may not align with their gender identity.

There is a popular misconception that searches by regulators who are seeking administrative monetary penalties (“AMPs”) are not subject to the Charter. Perhaps this misconception stems from the Guindon line of cases that have held that AMPS do not qualify as offences under the Charter. This misconception becomes all the more important as the magnitude of recent AMPS has crept into the territory formerly occupied by criminal law.

I.  AMPs are not Offences: Guindon Strikes Back

The most recent example of “Guindon Strikes Back” is the decision of Justice Andrew Little of the Competition Tribunal in Commissioner of Competition and Google Canada Corporation and Google LLC. Justice Little held that a potential AMP of $90 plus billion was hypothetical and the evidence did not show that an AMP for abuse of dominance would inherently “over-deter” or be punitive. It was however recognised that Google could be exposed to a maximum AMP that is very significant in absolute dollar terms. The Tribunal applied the four factor test in Guindon and held that Google had not met the “indisputably high bar” of the true penal consequences test and was not entitled to the procedural protections in section 11 of the Charter because if was not “charged with an offence” under the abuse of dominance provisions of the Competition Act.

Requests to admit (“RTAs”) are a useful but often overlooked instrument in a litigator’s toolbox. Used to narrow the issues in dispute and to reduce the time and expense associated with proving uncontested facts or establishing the authenticity of documents, RTAs can also be used to secure admissions from opposing parties which, once made, can secure the release of a party from ongoing litigation.

An RTA can limit areas of disagreement in advance of trial and recent jurisprudence emphasizes that a party served with a proper RTA must respond thoughtfully. Denying the truth of every fact until closer to trial undermines the objectives of an already strained judicial system and hampers the parties from securing the most expeditious and least expensive determination of a dispute on its merits.

However, with the proliferation of images that are generated and/or altered by artificial intelligence, one is left questioning whether the “authenticity” of a document can ever be admitted absent guidance from an expert.

I. Introduction

In my May 2025 article, "The Shifting Landscape of Mortgage Enforcement: A Power of Sale Perspective in Ontario," I examined the uptick in power of sale proceedings and the mortgagee's duty to act providently when realizing on its security. In my follow-up piece, "Stepping into the Lender's Shoes: A Guarantor's Rights Under Section 2 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act," I explored how a paying guarantor can enforce when a borrower turns uncooperative. Those articles highlighted how rising defaults, fractured family finances and competing property interests have complicated mortgage enforcement in Ontario. This third article turns to a related procedural hurdle: the effect of Certificates of Pending Litigation on power of sale transactions.

Consider a scenario that has begun to surface in our practice: a mortgagee follows every step required by the Mortgages Act —provides proper notice, waits out the redemption period, obtains default judgment, and signs an Agreement of Purchase and Sale with a third party, promising clear title on closing. Then, the purchaser’s lawyer discovers a Certificate of Pending Litigation (‘CPL”) registered on title by a third party in litigation to which the mortgagee is not a party. The mortgagee first asks the land registry office to delete the registered instrument, but the registrar declines in the absence of consent or a court order. The mortgagee then seeks relief from the court, only to be met with a first‑instance decision that the court lacks jurisdiction to assist.

The recent Olympic and Paralympic games manifestly demonstrated, to quote the famous line from ABC’s Wide World of Sports the “thrill of victory” [the US victories over Canada in both men’s Olympic and Paralympic hockey, and women’s Olympic hockey], and the “agony of defeat” [Canada’s defeat by the US in both men’s Olympic and Paralympic hockey, and women’s Olympic hockey]. For the parties involved, motions for injunctive relief often emulate these “thrills” and “agonies”. 

Introduction

Generally speaking, administrative tribunals are given deference by reviewing courts in selecting their own procedure. Reviewing courts understand that tribunals must balance the procedural rights of parties to a fair hearing, with the need to expeditiously determine the matters before them.

But in Sharpe v. CTS Canadian College, 2026 ONSC 1138 (Div. Ct.), and Nuroh v. TD General Insurance Co., 2025 ONSC 6997 (Div. Ct.), the Divisional Court found that the processes chosen by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario and the License Appeal Tribunal were unfair. In both cases, the applicant’s ability to cross-examine a key witness was restricted.

Sharpe stems from the HRTO’s failure to adhere to its own rules that enshrine the right to cross-examine key witnesses, without explanation. By contrast, in Nuroh, the Divisional Court criticized the LAT for relying too much on its rules at the expense of a fair hearing.