The Court of Appeal in Nigro v. Luciano[1] upheld the motion judge’s finding that a dog walker who was attacked by the dog she was walking and in control of qualified as an “owner” for the purposes of the Dog Owners' Liability Act[2] ("DOLA"). Accordingly, she could not recover damages from who would commonly be considered to be the dog's actual owners.
In Justice Pomerance's decision, it is made clear that DOLA does not restrict liability to those with the highest level of authority over a dog. Affirming the principle from the Court of Appeal's previous decision, Wilk v. Arbour[3] ("Wilk"), the Court held that a person in physical possession and control of a dog just before it bites or attacks is a person who "possesses" the dog and is therefore considered to be an "owner" under DOLA.
The Facts
Amanda Nigro (the "Appellant") was a professional dog walker employed by a company and hired by Michael Luciano and Amanda Luciano (the "Respondents"), to walk their boxer dog, Forrest Gump ("Forrest"). The Appellant had been walking Forrest for the Respondents three times a week beginning in November 2021 and had keys to the Respondents' home.
In February 2022, Forrest developed a paw infection and it was recommended by a veterinarian that he wear booties during walks in wet or muddy conditions. The Respondents communicated to the Appellant by text that Forrest's toenails had been removed and that he only be allowed to walk on snow to avoid infection. The Respondents advised that there were booties available for Forrest and the Appellant confirmed that if it were "mucky" outside, then she would put the booties on Forrest.
On the day of the incident, while the Appellant was attempting to put Forrest's booties on for the first time inside the Respondents' home, Forrest attacked and bit her in multiple locations. She then commenced an action against Respondents, alleging they were strictly liable under DOLA and claimed $1 million in damages, comprised of general damages in the amount of $350,000 and special damages in the amount of $650,000.[4]
The Motion for Summary Judgment
In response to the Appellant's action, the Respondents brought a motion for summary judgment arguing that the Appellant was herself an "owner" under DOLA and therefore jointly and severally liable.
The motion judge agreed with the Respondents, finding that an owner cannot recover damages from another owner under DOLA and that the Appellant was therefore jointly and severally liable and had no cause of action against the Respondents.[5]
The motions judge followed the ruling in Wilk and rejected the Appellant's argument that the Respondents were the true owners and that she was merely carrying out their instructions as a hired dog walker, emphasizing that DOLA does not require "dominion or ultimate control" over an animal.[6] The motions judge found that the Appellant was “unquestionably” an owner under DOLA because she was alone with Forrest, in "physical possession and control" of him, and best positioned to prevent the attack.[7]
The Court of Appeal Upheld the Motion Judge's Decision
The Appellant dog walker appealed the motion for summary judgement decision on the basis that the motion judge erred in finding her to be an "owner" under DOLA.
DOLA defines "owner" in s. 1(1) as follows:
“Owner”, when used in relation to a dog, includes a person who possesses or harbours the dog and, where the owner is a minor, the person responsible for the custody of the minor.
The Appellant argued that the matter was distinguishable from Wilk because she was not a "true owner" due to her passively carrying out the wishes of the Respondents by following instructions to place booties on Forrest, and because the attack took place in the Respondents' home.
The Appellant Met the Definition of "Owner" Under DOLA
With respect to the Appellant's argument that she was not a true owner because she was following the Respondents' instructions, Justice Pomerance noted that the instructions from the Respondents were of no legal significance and that the best person to assess whether, when, and how instructions are to be carried out is the person who is actually in physical possession of the dog.[8]
Justice Pomerance then confirmed, citing Wilk, that the legislature's intention with DOLA is to impose liability on "those persons best placed to control the dog and prevent damage to persons and other animals" and there is no requirement that the possessor be the only owner or be acting exclusively of their own volition.[9]
While the determination of who qualifies as an “owner” under DOLA is fact and context‑specific, Justice Pomerance found the Appellant met that definition for the following reasons:[10]
- She was unquestionably the person best positioned to control the behaviour of the dog at the time of attack;
- She was the sole person in the company of the dog at the time of the incident;
- She was employed by the respondents and had attended at the home to care for the dog three times a week; and
- She had been in possession of the dog on prior occasions and was similarly in possession of the dog on the day of the incident.
The Location of the Attack in the Owners’ Home Does Not Affect Liability
With respect to the Appellant's other argument, Justice Pomerance confirmed that liability is not governed by the location of an incident.[11] Under s. 3(1) of DOLA, where a dog bite occurs on the premises of the owner, liability is governed by DOLA alone, which expressly displaces the Occupiers’ Liability Act: [12]
3 (1) Where damage is caused by being bitten or attacked by a dog on the premises of the owner, the liability of the owner is determined under this Act and not under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.
Justice Pomerance noted that DOLA is designed to place responsibility on those who are in the best position to prevent dog bites, regardless of where the incident occurs.[13] Accordingly, allowing someone who meets the definition of "owner" to avoid being held responsible simply because they were in someone else's home at the time of the incident would undermine that legislative objective.[14]
Accordingly, since the Appellant was an "owner" under DOLA, Justice Pomerance dismissed the appeal.
The decision of Nigro v. Luciano serves as a caution to those who may be temporarily in possession of a dog (whether it be for commercial purposes or otherwise) that by taking possession of the dog they also assume responsibility for the dog's actions.
[1] Nigro v. Luciano, 2026 ONCA 283 [Nigro].
[2] Dog Owners' Liability Act, RSO 1990, c D.16.
[3] Wilk v. Arbour, 2017 ONCA 21.
[4] Nigro, supra note 1 at para 11.
[5] Ibid at paras 12-15.
[6] Ibid at para 14.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid at para 22.
[9] Ibid at para 23.
[10] Ibid at para 24.
[11] Ibid at para 20.
[12] Occupiers' Liability Act, RSO 1990, c O.2.
[13] Nigro, supra note 1 at para 21.
[14] Ibid.
