For good reason, the law of evidence restricts the admission of irrelevant details that may distract a trier of fact or give rise to improper inferences. There are exceptions, instances where such details provide valuable context that assists the trier of fact in understanding or evaluating other evidence. Despite their technical irrelevance, such details may be admissible as “narrative”.
Unsurprisingly, a doctrine that lowers the standard of relevance for admissibility is ripe for abuse. In MJL Enterprises Inc. v SAL Marketing Inc.,[1] (“MJL”), the Ontario Court of Appeal criticized the routine admission of documents and testimony “as narrative” and revisited the proper application of the narrative evidence doctrine. The Court had harsh words for those who use “narrative” as a convenient excuse for bringing in evidence without rigorous examination. At the same time, the Court affirmed the value of properly adduced narrative evidence.
This article explains the legal foundation of narrative evidence, unpacks MJL, and offers practical suggestions for counsel who seek to admit or resist narrative material.
What is “Narrative” Evidence?
Narrative evidence developed in criminal cases, where it was recognized for its explanatory value in circumstances where the other available evidence was old, limited, or easy to misconstrue.[2] In these circumstances, reliable narrative evidence helps juries and judges fill in gaps, understand the sequence of events, and put other evidence in its proper context.[3] The value of narrative has also been recognized in other areas of litigation.[4]
Most narrative evidence would be prima facie excluded because it is not relevant to a live issue. However, courts have relaxed the usual standard of relevance to admit narrative[5] because narrative evidence is merely explanatory, not probative, and it is not to be relied on for the proof of its contents.[6]
The term “narrative evidence” is used inconsistently and not always accurately. It is helpful to think of three loose categories of evidence that have been referred to as “narrative”:
- Pure narrative: irrelevant, immaterial information that is admitted solely to make admissible evidence intelligible.[7]
- Background or contextual evidence: facts that illuminate the setting in which material events occurred and assist the trier in assessing credibility or motive. This evidence is relevant and material and is therefore more like circumstantial evidence than narrative evidence (which is not relevant).
- Prior consistent statements, relationship, “bad act”, or similar fact evidence: evidence tendered, not for its truth, but to explain a witness’s conduct, for example to explain why a complainant delayed reporting an event to the police. This is the category most likely to be confused with a hearsay exception.[8]
Not a Hearsay Exception
Because narrative often includes out-of-court statements, some counsel (and judges) mistakenly refer to a “narrative exception” to the rule against hearsay, confusing the functions of hearsay and narrative. Unlike hearsay, narrative evidence is not adduced for the truth of its contents[9] so the hearsay rule is not engaged.[10] Conversely, if the proponent seeks to rely on the statement for its truth, the statement is hearsay and must satisfy an established exception or the principled approach to hearsay of necessity and reliability. Calling such a statement “narrative” because the standard of relevance is not met is not an acceptable use of narrative evidence.
Narrative overlaps with hearsay in that, even when offered solely to round out the story, narrative material must be necessary to render admissible evidence coherent. If the trier can understand the story without it, the narrative evidence should be excluded.[11] Another similarity is that narrative is only admissible if its explanatory value outweighs its prejudicial effect.[12] Evidence adduced as “narrative” must not overwhelm or distract from that which is truly relevant to the live issues in the case.[13]
MJL Enterprises v SAL Marketing
The Court of Appeal decision in MJL explains how not to treat “narrative” as a catch-all for inadmissible evidence. In a civil dispute about whether a contract had been breached, the plaintiff tendered an “omnibus” package of emails, screenshots and other records to show the history of the parties’ relationship. The trial judge admitted the entire package “for narrative” without identifying any specific evidentiary use.
On appeal, Paciocco J.A. (writing for the Court) held that admitting the collection of documents as “narrative” was an error. First, the omnibus package related primarily to technical issues and negotiations that had no bearing on the pleaded causes of action. It failed to satisfy even the attenuated standard of relevance for narrative evidence. Second, the trial judge failed to explain how the documents were necessary to understand the admissible evidence. In many instances, ordinary testimony would have sufficed. Finally, placing the package before the trier of fact without a clear understanding of what it was intended to explain risked improper reliance on its contents, contrary to the principle that narrative facts are not evidence.
The Court dismissed the appeal but used the opportunity to remind trial judges (and counsel) that narrative should not be used unless required to make sense of admissible evidence. When narrative material is admitted, its limits must be carefully explained. The best practice is to mark such material as a separate exhibit to separate it from non-narrative evidence that may properly ground findings of fact.
MJL explains how to use narrative evidence properly. Narrative is not a back door for inadmissible evidence or a way to avoid debates over admissibility when a party seeks to bring in binders of documents that are unlikely to influence the outcome of the case. At the same time, MJL reaffirms that narrative may be admitted when it is necessary to understand or put in context directly relevant evidence.
Practical Guidance
After MJL, trial judges will approach narrative evidence with renewed caution. A few practical pointers can help civil litigators navigate narrative evidence confidently:
- Identify the gap: Before offering narrative material, articulate the specific gap it will fill. Ask: “will the judge struggle to understand the admissible evidence without this information?” If the answer is no, leave the narrative out.
- Use lettered exhibits or read-ins: If documents are required purely for narrative, mark them as lettered exhibits or read the necessary portions into the record on a voir dire. That preserves an appellate record without putting potentially prejudicial material before the jury.
- Seek limiting instructions: When narrative evidence adduced by the opposing party is admitted, request a clear instruction that it is admitted solely to help the judge or jury follow the story and may not be used to prove the truth of its contents.
- Challenge ambiguous “narrative” evidence: Where opposing counsel proffers material “for narrative,” demand specifics. What issue does it illuminate? Can the witness explain the point without the document?
- Beware of prior consistent statements: If a prior statement is offered ostensibly to explain conduct, ensure that the trier is cautioned against using the statement to bolster credibility. Narrative cannot become a vehicle for oath-helping or other improper inferences.
- Maintain proportionality: Too much narrative can overwhelm the real evidence. Keep narrative concise and tethered to the point it serves.
Conclusion
Narrative evidence serves an important function when it allows the trier of fact to follow the story or evaluate reliability, but MJL reminds counsel that the narrative label is not a way to bypass the fundamental requirements for admissible evidence: relevance, necessity, and fairness. By applying the same rigorous standards applicable to all evidence, litigators can confidently identify opportunities to adduce narrative and challenge it when improperly presented.
[1] 2025 ONCA 120.
[2] R v Curto, 2008 ONCA 161 at para 31 [Curto].
[3] R v F.(J.E.), (1993) 16 OR (3d) 1 (ONCA) at p 474; R v Reimer, 2024 ONCA 519 at para 63, leave to appeal to SCC dismissed 2025 CanLII 38354.
[4] See, e.g., Concord Pacific Acquisitions Inc. v Oei, 2018 BCSC 2408; Huebner v PR Seniors Housing Management Ltd., D.B.A. Retirement Concepts, 2021 BCSC 837; Annapolis (County) v E.A. Farren Limited, 2021 NSSC 304.
[5] R v White, 2011 SCC 13 at para 47 [White].
[6] R v M.C., 2014 ONCA 611 at para 65.
[7] See, e.g., White at para 84.
[8] While widespread, the use of narrative to permit the inclusion of otherwise inadmissible prior consistent statements or “bad acts” has been criticized as a result-driven misuse of the “narrative” label: Christopher Nowlin, “Narrative Evidence: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing”, Part I, 2006 51 CLQ 238.
[9] MJL at para 20.
[10] R v M.C., 2014 ONCA 611 at para 54.
[11] Christopher Nowlin, “Narrative Evidence: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing”, Part I, 2006 51 CLQ 238.
[12] See, e.g., Prince Edward Island (Director of Child Protection) v P(C), 2014 PECA 18 at paras 50-53.
[13] R v Taweel, 2015 NSCA 107.
